What is Quantum Field Theory, and What Did We Think It Is? by Weinberg, Steven
ar
X
iv
:h
ep
-th
/9
70
20
27
v1
  4
 F
eb
 1
99
7
UTTG-05-97
What is Quantum Field Theory, and What Did We Think It Is?∗
Steven Weinberg∗∗
Physics Department, University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX 78712
Quantum field theory was originally thought to be simply the quantum
theory of fields. That is, when quantum mechanics was developed physicists
already knew about various classical fields, notably the electromagnetic field,
so what else would they do but quantize the electromagnetic field in the same
way that they quantized the theory of single particles? In 1926, in one of
the very first papers on quantum mechanics,1 Born, Heisenberg and Jordan
presented the quantum theory of the electromagnetic field. For simplicity
they left out the polarization of the photon, and took spacetime to have
one space and one time dimension, but that didn’t affect the main results.
(Response to comment from audience: Yes, they were really doing string
theory, so in this sense string theory is earlier than quantum field theory.)
Born et al. gave a formula for the electromagnetic field as a Fourier transform
and used the canonical commutation relations to identify the coefficients in
this Fourier transform as operators that destroy and create photons, so that
when quantized this field theory became a theory of photons. Photons, of
course, had been around (though not under that name) since Einstein’s work
on the photoelectric effect two decades earlier, but this paper showed that
photons are an inevitable consequence of quantum mechanics as applied to
electromagnetism.
The quantum theory of particles like electrons was being developed at
the same time, and made relativistic by Dirac2 in 1928–1930. For quite a
long time many physicists thought that the world consisted of both fields
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and particles: the electron is a particle, described by a relativistically in-
variant version of the Schro¨dinger wave equation, and the electromagnetic
field is a field, even though it also behaves like particles. Dirac I think never
really changed his mind about this, and I believe that this was Feynman’s
understanding when he first developed the path integral and worked out his
rules for calculating in quantum electrodynamics. When I first learned about
the path-integral formalism, it was in terms of electron trajectories (as it is
also presented in the book by Feynman and Hibbs3). I already thought that
wasn’t the best way to look at electrons, so this gave me an distaste for the
path integral formalism, which although unreasonable lasted until I learned
of ’t Hooft’s work4 in 1971. I feel it’s all right to mention autobiographical
details like that as long as the story shows how the speaker was wrong.
In fact, it was quite soon after the Born–Heisenberg–Jordan paper of
1926 that the idea came along that in fact one could use quantum field
theory for everything, not just for electromagnetism. This was the work
of many theorists during the period 1928–1934, including Jordan, Wigner,
Heisenberg, Pauli, Weisskopf, Furry, and Oppenheimer. Although this is
often talked about as second quantization, I would like to urge that this
description should be banned from physics, because a quantum field is not
a quantized wave function. Certainly the Maxwell field is not the wave
function of the photon, and for reasons that Dirac himself pointed out, the
Klein–Gordon fields that we use for pions and Higgs bosons could not be
the wave functions of the bosons. In its mature form, the idea of quantum
field theory is that quantum fields are the basic ingredients of the universe,
and particles are just bundles of energy and momentum of the fields. In
a relativistic theory the wave function is a functional of these fields, not a
function of particle coordinates. Quantum field theory hence led to a more
unified view of nature than the old dualistic interpretation in terms of both
fields and particles.
There is an irony in this. (I’ll point out several ironies as I go along — this
whole subject is filled with delicious ironies.) It is that although the battle
is over, and the old dualism that treated photons in an entirely different way
from electrons is I think safely dead and will never return, some calculations
are actually easier in the old particle framework. When Euler, Heisenberg and
Kockel5 in the mid-thirties calculated the effective action (often called the
Euler–Heisenberg action) of a constant external electromagnetic field, they
calculated to all orders in the field, although their result is usually presented
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only to fourth order. This calculation would probably have been impossible
with the old fashioned perturbation theory techniques of the time, if they
had not done it by first solving the Dirac equation in a constant external
electromagnetic field and using those Dirac wave functions to figure out the
effective action. These techniques of using particle trajectories rather than
field histories in calculations have been revived in recent years. Under the
stimulus of string theory, Bern and Kosower,6 in particular, have developed
a useful formalism for doing calculations by following particle world lines
rather than by thinking of fields evolving in time. Although this approach
was stimulated by string theory, it has been reformulated entirely within the
scope of ordinary quantum field theory, and simply represents a more efficient
way of doing certain calculations.
One of the key elements in the triumph of quantum field theory was the
development of renormalization theory. I’m sure this has been discussed often
here, and so I won’t dwell on it. The version of renormalization theory that
had been developed in the late 1940s remained somewhat in the shade for a
long time for two reasons: (1) for the weak interactions it did not seem pos-
sible to develop a renormalizable theory, and (2) for the strong interactions
it was easy to write down renormalizable theories, but since perturbation
theory was inapplicable it did not seem that there was anything that could
be done with these theories. Finally all these problems were resolved through
the development of the standard model, which was triumphantly verified by
experiments during the mid-1970s, and today the weak, electromagnetic and
strong interactions are happily all described by a renormalizable quantum
field theory. If you had asked me in the mid-1970s about the shape of future
fundamental physical theories, I would have guessed that they would take the
form of better, more all-embracing, less arbitrary, renormalizable quantum
field theories. I gave a talk at the Harvard Science Center at around this
time, called “The Renaissance of Quantum Field Theory,” which shows you
the mood I was in.
There were two things that especially attracted me to the ideas of renor-
malization and quantum field theory. One of them was that the requirement
that a physical theory be renormalizable is a precise and rational criterion of
simplicity. In a sense, this requirement had been used long before the advent
of renormalization theory. When Dirac wrote down the Dirac equation in
1928 he could have added an extra ‘Pauli’ term7 which would have given
the electron an arbitrary anomalous magnetic moment. Dirac could (and
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perhaps did) say ‘I won’t add this term because it’s ugly and complicated
and there’s no need for it.’ I think that in physics this approach generally
makes good strategies but bad rationales. It’s often a good strategy to study
simple theories before you study complicated theories because it’s easier to
see how they work, but the purpose of physics is to find out why nature is
the way it is, and simplicity by itself is I think never the answer. But renor-
malizability was a condition of simplicity which was being imposed for what
seemed after Dyson’s 1949 papers8 like a rational reason, and it explained not
only why the electron has the magnetic moment it has, but also (together
with gauge symmetries) all the detailed features of the standard model of
weak, electromagnetic, and strong, interactions, aside from some numerical
parameters.
The other thing I liked about quantum field theory during this period
of tremendous optimism was that it offered a clear answer to the ancient
question of what we mean by an elementary particle: it is simply a particle
whose field appears in the Lagrangian. It doesn’t matter if it’s stable, unsta-
ble, heavy, light — if its field appears in the Lagrangian then it’s elementary,
otherwise it’s composite.∗∗∗
Now my point of view has changed. It has changed partly because of my
experience in teaching quantum field theory. When you teach any branch
of physics you must motivate the formalism — it isn’t any good just to
present the formalism and say that it agrees with experiment — you have
to explain to the students why this the way the world is. After all, this is
our aim in physics, not just to describe nature, but to explain nature. In the
course of teaching quantum field theory, I developed a rationale for it, which
very briefly is that it is the only way of satisfying the principles of Lorentz
invariance plus quantum mechanics plus one other principle.
Let me run through this argument very rapidly. The first point is to start
with Wigner’s definition of physical multi-particle states as representations
of the inhomogeneous Lorentz group.9 You then define annihilation and cre-
ation operators a(~p, σ, n) and a†(~p, σ, n) that act on these states (where ~p is
the three-momentum, σ is the spin z-component, and n is a species label).
There’s no physics in introducing such operators, for it is easy to see that
∗∗∗We should not really give quantum field theory too much credit for clarifying the dis-
tinction between elementary and composite particles, because some quantum field theories
exhibit the phenomenon of bosonization: At least in two dimensions there are theories of
elementary scalars that are equivalent to theories with elementary fermions.
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any operator whatever can be expressed as a functional of them. The exis-
tence of a Hamiltonian follows from time-translation invariance, and much
of physics is described by the S-matrix, which is given by the well known
Feynman–Dyson series of integrals over time of time-ordered products of the
interaction Hamiltonian HI(t) in the interaction picture;
S =
∞∑
n=0
(−i)n
n!
∫ ∞
−∞
dt1
∫ ∞
−∞
dt2 · · ·
∫ ∞
−∞
dtn
× T{HI(t1)HI(t2) · · ·HI(tn)} . (1)
This should all be familiar. The other principle that has to be added is the
cluster decomposition principle, which requires that distant experiments give
uncorrelated results.10 In order to have cluster decomposition, the Hamilto-
nian is written not just as any functional of creation and annihilation oper-
ators, but as a power series in these operators with coefficients that (aside
from a single momentum-conservation delta function) are sufficiently smooth
functions of the momenta carried by the operators. This condition is satisfied
for an interaction Hamiltonian of the form
HI(t) =
∫
d3x H(~x, t) (2)
where H(x) is a power series (usually a polynomial) with terms that are
local in annihilation fields, which are Fourier transforms of the annihilation
operators:
ψ
(+)
ℓ (x) =
∫
d3p
∑
σ,n
eip·xuℓ(~p, σ, n) a(~p, σ, n) (3)
together of course with their adjoints, the creation fields.
So far this all applies to nonrelativistic as well as relativistic theories.†
Now if you also want Lorentz invariance, then you have to face the fact that
the time-ordering in the Feynman–Dyson series (1) for the S-matrix doesn’t
look very Lorentz invariant. The obvious way to make the S-matrix Lorentz
invariant is to take the interaction Hamiltonian density H(x) to be a scalar,
†By the way, the reason that quantum field theory is useful even in nonrelativistic
statistical mechanics, where there is often a selection rule that makes the actual creation
or annihilation of particles impossible, is that in statistical mechanics you have to impose
a cluster decomposition principle, and quantum field theory is the natural way to do so.
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and also to require that these Hamiltonian densities commute at spacelike
separations
[H(x),H(y)] = 0 for spacelike x− y , (4)
in order to exploit the fact that time ordering is Lorentz invariant when
the separation between spacetime points is timelike. In order to satisfy the
requirement that the Hamiltonian density commute with itself at spacelike
separations, it is constructed out of fields which satisfy the same requirement.
These are given by sums of fields that annihilate particles plus fields that
create the corresponding antiparticles
ψℓ(x) =
∑
σ,n
∫
d3p
[
eip·x uℓ(~p, σ, n) a(~p, σ, n)
+e−ip·x vℓ(~p, σ, n) a
†(~p, σ, n¯)
]
, (5)
where n¯ denotes the antiparticle of the particle of species n. For a field
ψℓ that transforms according to an irreducible representation of the homo-
geneous Lorentz group, the form of the coefficients uℓ and vℓ is completely
determined (up to a single over-all constant factor) by the Lorentz transfor-
mation properties of the fields and one-particle states, and by the condition
that the fields commute at spacelike separations. Thus the whole formalism
of fields, particles, and antiparticles seems to be an inevitable consequence of
Lorentz invariance, quantum mechanics, and cluster decomposition, without
any ancillary assumptions about locality or causality.
This discussion has been extremely sketchy, and is subject to all sorts of
qualifications. One of them is that for massless particles, the range of possible
theories is slightly larger than I have indicated here. For example, in quantum
electrodynamics, in a physical gauge like Coulomb gauge, the Hamiltonian
is not of the form (2) — there is an additional term, the Coulomb potential,
which is bilocal and serves to cancel a non-covariant term in the propagator.
But relativistically invariant quantum theories always (with some qualifica-
tions I’ll come to later) do turn out to be quantum field theories, more or
less as I have described them here.
One can go further, and ask why we should formulate our quantum field
theories in terms of Lagrangians. Well, of course creation and annihilation
operators by themselves yield pairs of canonically conjugate variables; from
the as and a†s, it is easy to construct qs and ps. The time-dependence of
6
these operators is dictated in terms of the Hamiltonian, the generator of time
translations, so the Hamiltonian formalism is trivially always with us. But
why the Lagrangian formalism? Why do we enumerate possible theories by
giving their Lagrangians rather than by writing down Hamiltonians? I think
the reason for this is that it is only in the Lagrangian formalism (or more
generally the action formalism) that symmetries imply the existence of Lie
algebras of suitable quantum operators, and you need these Lie algebras to
make sensible quantum theories. In particular, the S-matrix will be Lorentz
invariant if there is a set of 10 sufficiently smooth operators satisfying the
commutation relations of the inhomogeneous Lorentz group. It’s not trivial
to write down a Hamiltonian that will give you a Lorentz invariant S-matrix
— it’s not so easy to think of the Coulomb potential just on the basis of
Lorentz invariance — but if you start with a Lorentz invariant Lagrangian
density then because of Noether’s theorem the Lorentz invariance of the S-
matrix is automatic.
Finally, what is the motivation for the special gauge invariant Lagrangians
that we use in the standard model and general relativity? One possible an-
swer is that quantum theories of mass zero, spin one particles violate Lorentz
invariance unless the fields are coupled in a gauge invariant way, while quan-
tum theories of mass zero, spin two particles violate Lorentz invariance unless
the fields are coupled in a way that satisfies the equivalence principle.
This has been an outline of the way I’ve been teaching quantum field
theory these many years. Recently I’ve put this all together into a book,11
now being sold for a negligible price. The bottom line is that quantum me-
chanics plus Lorentz invariance plus cluster decomposition implies quantum
field theory. But there are caveats that have to be attached to this, and I
can see David Gross in the front row anxious to take me by the throat over
various gaps in what I have said, so I had better list these caveats quickly to
save myself.
First of all, the argument I have presented is obviously based on pertur-
bation theory. Second, even in perturbation theory, I haven’t stated a clear
theorem, much less proved one. As I mentioned there are complications when
you have things like mass zero, spin one particles for example; in this case
you don’t really have a fully Lorentz invariant Hamiltonian density, or even
one that is completely local. Because of these complications, I don’t know
how even to state a general theorem, let alone prove it, even in perturbation
theory. But I don’t think that these are insuperable obstacles.
7
A much more serious objection to this not-yet-formulated theorem is that
there’s already a counter example to it: string theory. When you first learn
string theory it seems in an almost miraculous way to give Lorentz invariant,
unitary S-matrix elements without being a field theory in the sense that
I’ve been using it. (Of course it is a field theory in a different sense —
it’s a two dimensional conformally invariant field theory, but not a quantum
field theory in four spacetime dimensions.) So before even being formulated
precisely, this theorem suffers from at least one counter example.
Another fundamental problem is that the S-matrix isn’t everything. Space-
time could be radically curved, not just have little ripples on it. Also, at
finite temperature there’s no S-matrix because particles cannot get out to
infinite distances from a collision without bumping into things. Also, it
seems quite possible that at very short distances the description of events in
four-dimensional flat spacetime becomes inappropriate.
Now, all of these caveats really work only against the idea that the final
theory of nature is a quantum field theory. They leave open the view, which is
in fact the point of view of my book, that although you can not argue that rel-
ativity plus quantum mechanics plus cluster decomposition necessarily leads
only to quantum field theory, it is very likely that any quantum theory that
at sufficiently low energy and large distances looks Lorentz invariant and sat-
isfies the cluster decomposition principle will also at sufficiently low energy
look like a quantum field theory. Picking up a phrase from Arthur Wight-
man, I’ll call this a folk theorem. At any rate, this folk theorem is satisfied
by string theory, and we don’t know of any counterexamples.
This leads us to the idea of effective field theories. When you use quantum
field theory to study low-energy phenomena, then according to the folk the-
orem you’re not really making any assumption that could be wrong, unless
of course Lorentz invariance or quantum mechanics or cluster decomposition
is wrong, provided you don’t say specifically what the Lagrangian is. As
long as you let it be the most general possible Lagrangian consistent with
the symmetries of the theory, you’re simply writing down the most general
theory you could possibly write down. This point of view has been used in
the last fifteen years or so to justify the use of effective field theories, not just
in the tree approximation where they had been used for some time earlier,
but also including loop diagrams. Effective field theory was first used in this
way to calculate processes involving soft π mesons,12 that is, π mesons with
energy less than about 2πFπ ≈ 1200 MeV. The use of effective quantum
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field theories has been extended more recently to nuclear physics,13 where
although nucleons are not soft they never get far from their mass shell, and
for that reason can be also treated by similar methods as the soft pions.
Nuclear physicists have adopted this point of view, and I gather that they
are happy about using this new language because it allows one to show in a
fairly convincing way that what they’ve been doing all along (using two-body
potentials only, including one-pion exchange and a hard core) is the correct
first step in a consistent approximation scheme. The effective field theory
approach has been applied more recently to superconductivity. Shankar, I
believe, in a contribution to this conference is talking about this. The present
educated view of the standard model, and of general relativity,14 is again that
these are the leading terms in effective field theories.
The essential point in using an effective field theory is you’re not al-
lowed to make any assumption of simplicity about the Lagrangian. Certainly
you’re not allowed to assume renormalizability. Such assumptions might be
appropriate if you were dealing with a fundamental theory, but not for an
effective field theory, where you must include all possible terms that are con-
sistent with the symmetry. The thing that makes this procedure useful is
that although the more complicated terms are not excluded because they’re
non-renormalizable, their effect is suppressed by factors of the ratio of the
energy to some fundamental energy scale of the theory. Of course, as you go
to higher and higher energies, you have more and more of these suppressed
terms that you have to worry about.
On this basis, I don’t see any reason why anyone today would take Ein-
stein’s general theory of relativity seriously as the foundation of a quantum
theory of gravitation, if by Einstein’s theory is meant the theory with a La-
grangian density given by just the term
√
gR/16πG. It seems to me there’s
no reason in the world to suppose that the Lagrangian does not contain all
the higher terms with more factors of the curvature and/or more derivatives,
all of which are suppressed by inverse powers of the Planck mass, and of
course don’t show up at any energy far below the Planck mass, much less in
astronomy or particle physics. Why would anyone suppose that these higher
terms are absent?
Likewise, since now we know that without new fields there’s no way that
the renormalizable terms in the standard model could violate baryon con-
servation or lepton conservation, we now understand in a rational way why
baryon number and lepton number are as well conserved as they are, without
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having to assume that they are exactly conserved.†† Unless someone has
some a priori reason for exact baryon and lepton conservation of which I
haven’t heard, I would bet very strong odds that baryon number and lepton
number conservation are in fact violated by suppressed non-renormalizable
corrections to the standard model.
These effective field theories are non-renormalizable in the old Dyson
power-counting sense. That is, although to achieve a given accuracy at any
given energy, you need only take account of a finite number of terms in the
action, as you increase the accuracy or the energy you need to include more
and more terms, and so you have to know more and more. On the other
hand, effective field theories still must be renormalizable theories in what I
call the modern sense: the symmetries that govern the action also have to
govern the infinities, for otherwise there will be infinities that can’t be elimi-
nated by absorbing them into counter terms to the parameters in the action.
This requirement is automatically satisfied for unbroken global symmetries,
such as Lorentz invariance and isotopic spin invariance and so on. Where it’s
not trivial is for gauge symmetries. We generally deal with gauge theories
by choosing a gauge before quantizing the theory, which of course breaks
the gauge invariance, so it’s not obvious how gauge invariance constrains
the infinities. (There is a symmetry called BRST invariance15 that survives
gauge fixing, but that’s non-linearly realized, and non-linearly realized sym-
metries of the action are not symmetries of the Feynman amplitudes.) This
raises a question, whether gauge theories that are not renormalizable in the
power counting sense are renormalizable in the modern sense. The theorem
that says that infinities are governed by the same gauge symmetries as the
terms in the Lagrangian was originally proved back in the old days by ’t
Hooft and Veltman16 and Lee and Zinn-Justin17 only for theories that are
renormalizable in the old power-counting sense, but this theorem has only
recently been extended to theories of the Yang–Mills18 or Einstein type with
arbitrary numbers of complicated interactions that are not renormalizable in
the power-counting sense.‡ You’ll be reassured to know that these theories
are renormalizable in the modern sense, but there’s no proof that this will
††The extra fields required by low-energy supersymmetry may invalidate this argument.
‡I refer here to work of myself and Joaquim Gomis,19 relying on recent theorems about
the cohomology of the Batalin–Vilkovisky operator by Barnich, Brandt, and Henneaux.20
Earlier work along these lines but with different motivation was done by Voronov, Tyutin,
and Lavrov;21 Anselmi;22 and Harada, Kugo, and Yamawaki.23
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be true of all quantum field theories with local symmetries.
I promised you a few ironies today. The second one takes me back to
the early 1960s when S-matrix theory was very popular at Berkeley and
elsewhere. The hope of S-matrix theory was that, by using the principles of
unitarity, analyticity, Lorentz invariance and other symmetries, it would be
possible to calculate the S-matrix, and you would never have to think about a
quantum field. In a way, this hope reflected a kind of positivistic puritanism:
we can’t measure the field of a pion or a nucleon, so we shouldn’t talk about
it, while we do measure S-matrix elements, so this is what we should stick
to as ingredients of our theories. But more important than any philosophical
hang-ups was the fact that quantum field theory didn’t seem to be going
anywhere in accounting for the strong and weak interactions.
One problem with the S-matrix program was in formulating what is
meant by the analyticity of the S-matrix. What precisely are the analytic
properties of a multi-particle S-matrix element? I don’t think anyone ever
knew. I certainly didn’t know, so even though I was at Berkeley I never got
too enthusiastic about the details of this program, although I thought it was
a lovely idea in principle. Eventually the S-matrix program had to retreat,
as described by Kaiser in a contribution to this conference, to a sort of mix
of field theory and S-matrix theory. Feynman rules were used to find the sin-
gularities in the S-matrix, and then they were thrown away, and the analytic
structure of the S-matrix with these singularities, together with unitarity
and Lorentz invariance, was used to do calculations.
Unfortunately to use these assumptions it was necessary to make uncon-
trolled approximations, such as the strip approximation, whose mention will
bring tears to the eyes of those of us who are old enough to remember it. By
the mid-1960’s it was clear that S-matrix theory had failed in dealing with
the one problem it had tried hardest to solve, that of pion–pion scattering.
The strip approximation rested on the assumption that double dispersion re-
lations are dominated by regions of the Mandelstam diagram near the fringes
of the physical region, which would only make sense if π–π scattering is strong
at low energy, and these calculations predicted that π–π scattering is indeed
strong at low energy, which was at least consistent, but it was then discov-
ered that π–π scattering is not strong at low energy. Current algebra came
along at just that time, and was used to predict not only that low energy π-π
scattering is not strong, but also successfully predicted the values of the π–π
scattering lengths.24 From a practical point of view, this was the greatest
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defeat of S-matrix theory. The irony here is that the S-matrix philosophy is
not that far from the modern philosophy of effective field theories, that what
you should do is just write down the most general S-matrix that satisfies
basic principles. But the practical way to implement S-matrix theory is to
use an effective quantum field theory — instead of deriving analyticity prop-
erties from Feynman diagrams, we use the Feynman diagrams themselves.
So here’s another answer to the question of what quantum field theory is: it
is S-matrix theory, made practical.
By the way, I think that the emphasis in S-matrix theory on analyticity
as a fundamental principle was misguided, not only because no one could
ever state the detailed analyticity properties of general S-matrix elements,
but also because Lorentz invariance requires causality (because as I argued
earlier otherwise you’re not going to get a Lorentz invariant S-matrix), and
in quantum field theory causality allows you to derive analyticity proper-
ties. So I would include Lorentz invariance, quantum mechanics and cluster
decomposition as fundamental principles, but not analyticity.
As I have said, quantum field theories provide an expansion in powers
of the energy of a process divided by some characteristic energy; for soft
pions this characteristic energy is about a GeV; for superconductivity it’s
the Debye frequency or temperature; for the standard model it’s 1015 to 1016
GeV; and for gravitation it’s about 1018 GeV. Any effective field theory loses
its predictive power when the energy of the processes in question approaches
the characteristic energy. So what happen to the effective field theories of
electroweak, strong, and gravitational interactions at energies of order 1015–
1018 GeV? I know of only two plausible alternatives.
One possibility is that the theory remains a quantum field theory, but one
in which the finite or infinite number of renormalized couplings do not run off
to infinity with increasing energy, but hit a fixed point of the renormalization
group equations. One way that can happen is provided by asymptotic free-
dom in a renormalizable theory,25 where the fixed point is at zero coupling,
but it’s possible to have more general fixed points with infinite numbers of
non-zero nonrenormalizable couplings. Now, we don’t know how to calculate
these non-zero fixed points very well, but one thing we know with fair cer-
tainty is that the trajectories that run into a fixed point in the ultraviolet
limit form a finite dimensional subspace of the infinite dimensional space of
all coupling constants. (If anyone wants to know how we know that, I’ll ex-
plain this later.) That means that the condition, that the trajectories hit a
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fixed point, is just as restrictive in a nice way as renormalizability used to be:
It reduces the number of free coupling parameters to a finite number. We
don’t yet know how to do calculations for fixed points that are not near zero
coupling. Some time ago I proposed26 that these calculations could be done
in the theory of gravitation by working in 2 + ǫ dimensions and expanding
in powers of ǫ = 2, in analogy with the way that Wilson and Fisher27 had
calculated critical exponents by working in 4− ǫ dimensions and expanding
in powers of ǫ = 1, but this program doesn’t seem to be working very well.
The other possibility, which I have to admit is a priori more likely, is that
at very high energy we will run into really new physics, not describable in
terms of a quantum field theory. I think that by far the most likely possibility
is that this will be something like a string theory.
Before I leave the renormalization group, I did want to say another word
about it because there’s going to be an interesting discussion on this sub-
ject here tomorrow morning, and for reasons I’ve already explained I can’t
be here. I’ve read a lot of argument about the Wilson approach28 vs. the
Gell-Mann–Low approach,29 which seems to me to call for reconciliation.
There have been two fundamental insights in the development of the renor-
malization group. One, due to Gell-Mann and Low, is that logarithms of
energy that violate naive scaling and invalidate perturbation theory arise be-
cause of the way that renormalized coupling constants are defined, and that
these logarithms can be avoided by renormalizing at a sliding energy scale.
The second fundamental insight, due to Wilson, is that it’s very important
in dealing with phenomena at a certain energy scale to integrate out the
physics at much higher energy scales. It seems to me these are the same
insight, because when you adopt the Gell-Mann–Low approach and define a
renormalized coupling at a sliding scale and use renormalization theory to
eliminate the infinities rather than an explicit cutoff, you are in effect inte-
grating out the higher energy degrees of freedom — the integrals converge
because after renormalization the integrand begins to fall off rapidly at the
energy scale at which the coupling constant is defined. (This is true whether
or not the theory is renormalizable in the power-counting sense.) So in other
words instead of a sharp cutoff a la Wilson, you have a soft cutoff, but it’s
a cutoff nonetheless and it serves the same purpose of integrating out the
short distance degrees of freedom. There are practical differences between
the Gell-Mann–Low and Wilson approaches, and there are some problems
for which one is better and other problems for which the other is better. In
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statistical mechanics it isn’t important to maintain Lorentz invariance, so
you might as well have a cutoff. In quantum field theories, Lorentz invari-
ance is necessary, so it’s nice to renormalize a la Gell-Mann–Low. On the
other hand, in supersymmetry theories there are some non-renormalization
theorems that are simpler if you use a Wilsonian cutoff than a Gell-Mann–
Low cutoff.30 These are all practical differences, which we have to take into
account, but I don’t find any fundamental philosophical difference between
these two approaches.
On the plane coming here I read a comment by Michael Redhead, in a
paper submitted to this conference: ‘To subscribe to the new effective field
theory programme is to give up on this endeavor’ [the endeavor of finding
really fundamental laws of nature], ‘and retreat to a position that is somehow
less intellectually exciting.’ It seems to me that this is analogous to saying
that to balance your checkbook is to give up dreams of wealth and have a life
that is intrinsically less exciting. In a sense that’s true, but nevertheless it’s
still something that you had better do every once in a while. I think that in
regarding the standard model and general relativity as effective field theories
we’re simply balancing our checkbook and realizing that we perhaps didn’t
know as much as we thought we did, but this is the way the world is and
now we’re going to go on the next step and try to find an ultraviolet fixed
point, or (much more likely) find entirely new physics. I have said that I
thought that this new physics takes the form of string theory, but of course,
we don’t know if that’s the final answer. Nielsen and Oleson31 showed long
ago that relativistic quantum field theories can have string-like solutions. It’s
conceivable, although I admit not entirely likely, that something like modern
string theory arises from a quantum field theory. And that would be the final
irony.
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